


SOUTHERN PLAINS WARFARE



A PUBLICATION OF THE THOMAS GILCREASE
INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND ART.
ROUTE 6 • TULSA, OKLAHOMA, 74106.


Indian Warfare, oil by Frederic Remington, reproduced on inside front and back of cover.



Sketches by Frederic Remington and watercolor studies by Olaf Seltzer reproduced on cover. Plates from *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1881-95) also featured.

Other sketches shown are from *From Everglades to Cañon With the 2nd Dragons*, T. F. Rodenbough, N.Y., 1875.

SOUTHERN PLAINS WARFARE



A report dealing with Indian warfare and military activity in Texas and the Southwest following the Civil War. Featuring transcriptions from the official records and letters of Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie.

All material reproduced in this issue is derived from the collections of the Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art.

MEMBERSHIP

Quarterly issues of the *American Scene* and *The Gilcrease Gazette* are mailed to members of the institute on a yearly basis. Members also receive a 20% discount on all books, prints or other items purchased in the gallery gift shop and are admitted free to special films programs.

MAGAZINE SUBSCRIPTION

Issues of the *American Scene* feature, available to annual subscribers, articles based on material derived from the resources of the Gilcrease Institute, which maintains one of the finest collections of American history and art in the nation.

SUBSCRIPTION 5.00 MEMBERSHIP 10.00

Single issues available 1.25

American Scene

A Publication of the Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art

My Name (PLEASE PRINT)

Address

City..... Zone..... State

Send Gift Subscription or Gift Membership to:

Name

Address

City..... Zone..... State

SUBSCRIPTION ☐

MEMBERSHIP ☐

☐ REMITTANCE ENCLOSED

PLEASE BILL ME ☐

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, WRITE TO GILCREASE INSTITUTE, RR #6, TULSA, OKLAHOMA

American Scene

GILCREASE INSTITUTE

*Founded by the late Thomas Gilcrease
Owned and operated by the City of Tulsa*

JAMES M. HEWGLEY, JR.
Mayor

NICK BROYLES
Chairman, Parks & Recreation Board

AMERICAN SCENE COMMITTEE

JAMES C. LEAKE Chairman
OTHA H. GRIMES Member
MORTON R. HARRISON Member

Editorial Staff

PAUL A. ROSSI Editor
DANIEL M. McPIKE Associate Editor
DAVID C. HUNT Associate Editor
MARIE KEENE Editorial Assistant
ELAINE PROCTOR Editorial Assistant
OLIVER WILLCOX Photography
ED MUNO Photography

Design, Layout, & Lithography
by Tulsa Litho Co., Inc., Tulsa

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

OTHA H. GRIMES Past Chairman
ALFRED E. AARONSON Past Chairman
WILLIAM S. BAILEY, JR. Past Chairman
GEORGE H. BOWEN Chairman
DAVID R. MILSTEN President
MORTON R. HARRISON Vice-President
MRS. ROGER DEVLIN Vice-President
JAMES C. LEAKE Vice-President
JOSEPH F. GLASS Secretary
WILLIAM S. BAILEY, JR. Treasurer
PAUL A. ROSSI Director of the Institute

Volume VIII, No. 2 of the American Scene, is published and copyrighted by the Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, an Oklahoma corporation. A \$10.00 membership in the Institute entitles the holder to four issues of the American Scene, along with membership privileges. Regular subscription \$5.00. Single issues, \$1.25. (Address: Rural Route #6, Tulsa, Oklahoma).

© Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, 1967.

The following article was compiled from available resources in the Gilcrease Institute and written for publication in the American Scene by Daniel M. McPike.

Authors of books, newspapers, magazine articles and movie scripts have been obsessed with Indian warfare since Colonial times. Terms such as Mohican, Iroquois, Shawnee, Sioux and Apache, or names such as Pontiac, Geronimo, Cochise, Sitting Bull and Buffalo Bill have become part of the American idiom. They have also become well-known in Europe and other parts of the world.

Practically everyone over five years of age is familiar with the story of "Custer's Last Stand," which took place on the Little Big Horn River in Montana between Custer and his 200-odd cavalry troops and some 3,000 Indians. Some even know of the other two elements of Custer's command under Major Reno and Captain Benteen, which were not annihilated. There are also numbers of people who know about Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce, Captain Jack and the Modocs, the Cherokee punitive expedition, and that the Blackfoot Indians were unfriendly from the start rather than waiting until they were provoked, as did most of the other Indians.

Indian warfare on the southern plains involved a few "big name" Indians, but with the exception of Custer's brief and flashy visit to this area in 1868, most of the well-known U.S. officers who campaigned on the southern plains earned their fame elsewhere since they were junior officers at the time of their involvement in this area. These names include both Robert and Fitzhugh Lee, as well as Lawton, Wood, Sibley, Chaffee and others. Ranald Mackenzie might have gone on to fame if he had not become ill so soon after impressing his superiors with his abilities. As it was, his success in the south resulted in his transfer to practically every troubled area in the western United States until illness forced his retirement in 1884.

If the border incidents of the late 1870's had gone full course, or even if his superiors had listened to his warning of impending war with Mexico, he might have been much better known than he is today. True, he was a general in the Civil War, but so were hundreds of others. Custer would be little known today if history merely recorded his Civil War service. But time and geography were not on Mackenzie's side. And as he says in one of his letters from Texas in 1878, if the events and people to whom he found it his duty to be opposed had been operating in New England or Illinois, the entire nation would have been mobilized.

Events taking place in Texas, Indian Territory, Kansas or New Mexico in the latter half of the 19th century were ordinarily of secondary importance to the people of the United States or the Congress. The nomadic plains tribes, who had been in existence longer than the United States had been a nation, were of little concern to Anglo-Americans until they crossed the Mississippi after 1803 to settle Louisiana, Texas and the Mexican Southwest. Before this time the problems



Illustration at right, reproduced from an original watercolor by Olaf Seltzer, depicts a typical U. S. Cavalry soldier on the southern plains in the 1870's.

American Scene Magazine

GILCREASE MEMBERSHIP OFFICE

830 BEACON BUILDING

TULSA, OKLAHOMA

PLACE
STAMP
HERE

American Scene



PUBLISHED BY
THE THOMAS GILCREASE INSTITUTE
OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND ART



Oil of *Fort Reno* by Vinson Lackey, at left, pictures one of the many forts constructed in the nineteenth century to maintain a line of defense along the western frontier of the United States.

Not all the Indians were incorruptible, however. One band of Comanche—the Penateka, or Honey-Eater band — might possibly have become Texans if the Texans themselves had not wanted their land. They were temporarily placed on a reservation in Texas, but as all Comanches were heartily disliked by the Texans, were ultimately removed to Indian Territory for their own protection. The Penatekas clung closely to the reservation and were never again part of the greater southern plains Indian problem.

As early as 1834 the Federal Government was interested enough in the Comanches and their allies, the Kiowa and Kiowa-Apache, to send military expeditions into their country for the purpose of promoting friendly relations. These expeditions did not meet with outstanding success. For a century the Indians raided where they liked and retreated with assurance to the untracked safety of the plains. Earlier Spanish punitive expeditions into their homelands had never been followed up and were soon forgotten. They raided into New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, along the Santa Fe and other trails, and into Mexico as far south as the city of Durango.

Trouble brewed from time to time, as well, with the eastern Indians who had been removed during the 1820's and 30's to Arkansas and Indian Territory. The Kickapoo, particularly, themselves became raiders and added to the problems with which the United States Army was faced on the plains along the Rio Grande after the Civil War.

In 1866 the Comanche, Kiowa and Kiowa-Apache held by force all of the country from the Rocky Mountains and south of the Arkansas River, as far east as central Indian Territory and southwest across Texas to the Rio Grande. A line of forts had been established in Texas along this latter line to protect the westward moving Texas settlers. The Mexican Government at this time was not too happy with the United States, so soon after being relieved of New Mexico, Texas, Arizona and California, and etc. and did nothing to stop the raids of the Kickapoo and Lipan Apache Indians from Mexico into Texas and New Mexico. They felt justified in that the United States did an equal amount of nothing to prevent the Comanche and Kiowa from raiding into Old Mexico.

Besides the Indians there were also Mexican bandits who crossed the river occasionally joining forces with the Indians. To complicate matters even further, the Comanches who cared little about international boundaries, raided Mexican villages on both sides of the river, claiming that this had no bearing on any promise made to the U.S. Government not to molest its citizens. In addition they could not seem to understand that Texans and "Americans" were one and the same thing.

In later years they utilized the agency at Fort Sill as a refuge and raided into Texas at will. This situation finally led to military control of the reservations and the ultimate defeat of the Indians when the cavalry chased them over the plains and arrested them at the agencies.

in that area had belonged to Spain, occasionally France, and Mexico, and the enduring problems could be summed up in two words: Comanche and Apache. Other tribes such as the Kickapoo and Potawatami, and the Mexican bandits, were of later occurrence, themselves products of the European governments.

In part, even the Comanche and Apache problems were the result of Spanish ineptness at handling the Indians, and it is possible that there might never have been a Comanche tribe if the Basin Shoshone had not been inadvertently supplied with Spanish horses. Not long after Don Juan Oñate led a group of settlers into northern New Mexico in 1595, the Spanish began to lose horses to the nomadic tribes of Apaches and Navajos to the east and north. By 1700 these horses had spread up through the Great Basin and reached the Shoshone of western Wyoming. Six years later some of these Shoshones—from this time forward called *Comanche*— were the main reason for the blockage of Spanish movement to the northeast, together with the Apachean tribes, mostly Lipan and Mescalero, whom the Comanche pushed into south Texas, Chihuahua, and the mountains of New Mexico in their successful bid to control the southern plains.

The Apachean tribes were still there in 1835 when the Anglo-American Texans won their independence from Mexico, and because of them Western Texas and Eastern New Mexico were still largely free of European settlement. A few daring, would-be ranchers and farmers had attempted to encroach on the Indian range, but they were usually pushed back or destroyed.



Oil by Frederic Remington entitled *Missing*, reproduced above. Bronze by Charles Schreyvogel featured below.



Portraits of Satanta and Lone Wolf, two Indian leaders who played important parts in the Plains Indian wars of the 1870's, are reproduced at right from original oils in the Gilcrease collection by H. H. Cross.



Into this troubled area rode Ranald S. Mackenzie as Commanding Officer of the 4th United States Cavalry. Mackenzie, as it later turned out, was to spend no small part of his military career in the West trying to persuade his superiors of the need for a better military organization.

One of his very first contacts with the Indians could well have turned into a particularly significant engagement. During the spring of 1871 a band of Kiowa were on a raiding party in the vicinity of Jacksboro, Texas, and following the advice of their medicine man, attacked the second wagon train rather than the first. The first wagon train contained Generals Sherman and Marcy, and had it been attacked, the entire United States Government would have been aroused.

General P. H. Sheridan in his "Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians within the Military Division of the Missouri from 1868 to 1882" (Chicago, 1882) ignores what could have happened to General of the Army W. T. Sherman with the following brief account:

"May 17 (1781) Indians attacked a train on the Red River, killing seven persons, wounding one and running off forty-one mules. Going to Fort Sill, Indian Territory, they publicly avowed the deed in the presence of General Sherman and the post commander, whereupon the leaders, Satanta and Satank, were arrested and placed in irons. Their followers resisted, when one Indian was killed and a soldier wounded."

Colonel Mackenzie pursued this group of Indians, but failed to catch them before their leaders were in irons at Fort Sill.


Mackenzie soon became the first U. S. military commander with a working knowledge of the geography of the southern high plains, particularly the "Llano Estacado" or "staked plains" of western Texas and east-

ern New Mexico. In 1871 and 1872 he led expeditions into this region, chasing Indians and cattle thieves, picking up knowledge of the terrain and of Indian habits which would stand him in good stead in later years. It was here that he learned to destroy captured Indian horses to prevent their being recaptured at night, a trick at which the Comanche and Kiowa were past-masters. Later in Palo Duro Cañon he would make himself locally famous by leaving a pile of horse bones that would whiten the ground for years.

The first entry in Mackenzie's ledger, housed in the Gilcrease Library archives, concerns a raid which Mackenzie made into Old Mexico in 1873 to punish the Lipan Apache and the Kickapoo Indians for raiding and stealing stock north of the Rio Grande. This raid established Mackenzie's reputation as a punisher of evil-doers and resulted in relative peace and quiet along the border for a number of years. When the area became troublesome again in 1878, Mackenzie once again found himself stationed at Fort Clark, in a situation which his correspondence indicates was very close to erupting into a second war with Mexico.

Between these two border periods Mackenzie was instrumental in the complete and final defeat of the Kiowa and Comanches, punishment of the Sioux and Cheyenne for the defacing of the 7th cavalry, and the maintenance of peace among the half-starved remnants of the plains tribes confined to reservations in Indian Territory, as well as personal and personnel problems, most of which stemmed from politics, graft, inefficiency, ambition or whiskey, about in that order.

The ledger book, itself, seems to have traveled widely. There are entries from forts Clark and Duncan in Texas during two different periods: from Fort Sill, Indian Territory; Fort Robinson, South Dakota; Fort Garland, Colorado; Santa Fe, New Mexico, and field camps in the Uncompahgre Mountains, Arizona, the Texas Panhandle and a few from Kansas and Arkansas.



Line drawing from an 1875 Government War Dept. circular, *Hygiene of the United States Army with Descriptions of Military Posts*, describes the ground plan of Fort Sill, Indian Territory, 1874. The oil painting of Fort Sill by Vinson Lackey, reproduced below, indicates the use which the artist made of such maps in reconstructing his views of important military establishments in early-day Oklahoma.





(Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie)

"May 18, Colonel R. S. Mackenzie, 4th Cavalry, with Troops "A," "B," "C," "E," "I," "M," of his regiment and a detachment of Seminole scouts under Lieutenant Bullis, 24th Infantry, attacked and destroyed a village of fifty or sixty lodges of Kickapoos and Lipan Indians near Remolina, Mexico, killing nineteen Indians, taking forty prisoners and capturing fifty-six horses. The column marched at a trot or a gallop a distance of seventy-five miles, between one o'clock in the afternoon of the previous day and six o'clock in the morning of the day of the attack in order to reach and surprise this village whose location had been reported. The pack train of supplies was dropped during this rapid march and for two days the troops were without other rations than a few crackers carried in their pockets. Among the prisoners taken was Costilietos, the principal Chief of the Lipans."

Sheridan thus describes the Mexico raid of 1873 and the tactics that separated Mackenzie from many other Indian fighting commanders. He was constantly in motion between posts or in the field, fitting his operations to the nature of the enemy. He could undoubtedly sense that a line of protective forts, with columns sent out only in pursuit of raiders, would not work. The raiders had to be tired out and destroyed on their home ground.

Fort Clark, Texas
May 22, 1873

My dear Williams:

We hit a band of Kickapoos and the Lipan tribes on the 18th, killed nineteen, destroyed their camp with about fifty lodges and plunder, captured old Costilietos, the Lipan Chief, and about thirty women and children, principally Kickapoos.

General can assure the Lipans and Kickapoos that their people will be treated in the kindest way so long as I have any control over them, and that I am ready to fight or make peace just as they please.

If the Lipans wish it would be well to let them live with the Tonkewas at Fort Griffin, and they could steal horses from the wild Comanches. Tell the Lipans that I shall write and ask General Augur to have Costilietos, the Chief of the Tonkawas and Johnson, the leading man among the young men of the Tonkawas, brought to San Antonio, Johnson, himself, a half breed Lipan.

If General Augur decides to send for them and they can be got to go, I will ask him to send Costilietos, Johnson, and one of the older of the Kickapoo squaws back to Mexico to see you and their tribes, and tell them if

they will come they will be protected. General can assure them that should my regiment furnish a guard for them, as it will, that they cross the River at Duncan or anywhere else, and that no citizen will be allowed to say a cuss word to them or claim a pony. Day before yesterday I shut up a Mexican for abusing old Costilietos, and yesterday I gave my new commissioned officers very strict orders to treat anyone very roughly who rumped any of the captives. General can tell the Kickapoos that I have already given their squaws, blankets as well as food.



My Regiment is now in magnificent order. General can tell both the Kickapoos and Lipans that I much regret that the Kickapoos suffered more than the Lipans: that I was more particularly in search of the Mescalero and Lipans than of the Kickapoos, but if their people will steal and associate with the Lipans and Mescaleros they must take the consequences. The camps are some hundred yards apart and separated by a slough of water, difficult to cross, and I happened to strike the Kickapoos first, giving the Lipans a good chance to get away which they made use of.

I only lost two men wounded.

Yours very truly,

(Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie)

The Wounded Bunkle, bronze, by Frederic Remington.



U. S. Army regulation guidons used in 1873-74.

The object of imprisoning Satanta and Satank, other than for the reason that Texas wanted to hang them for murder, was something of a ransom device to keep the Kiowa in line. The Kiowa—and Satanta insisted just before he was arrested that he alone was the leader—were the almost-murderers of Generals Sherman and Marcy, as well as the perpetrators of the Texas wagon train massacre mentioned in Sheridan's "Record of Engagements."

If there were any Comanches in the party, they, unlike Satanta, kept quiet about it. Having no leverage against them, they continued raiding as they always had. The Penatekas were "comfortably" settled at the agency near Fort Sill, as Mackenzie put it, "quietly starving to death;" but they were only a small part of the Comanche tribe. There were many other bands, some of whom spent some time around the agency, while some, like the Quohada band of the "staked plains," never came in.

The term Quohada means "sun shade people." Anyone who has spent any time on the Llano Estacado can appreciate why they were called this. They were the last Comanches to surrender at Fort Sill in 1875, and were the Comanches most respected—and most punished—by Mackenzie.

By 1874 the southern plains Indians had begun to feel the effect of depleted bison herds. The vanishing herds and the extensive military activity in the area pinched their economy and placed them in constant motion. For the first time in their life on the plains they were frightened and nervous. Sheridan

ment of Fort Reno Agency, and carried out several day-long sieges against a group of buffalo hunters basing themselves at Adobe Walls, the ruins of an old trading post on the Canadian River in the Texas Panhandle.

Settlers were attacked in Kansas and eastern Colorado. General Pope, commanding the Departments of the Missouri, finally got permission to pursue and fight them on the reservation. The Kiowa and Comanche tried to avoid this type of trouble by going to the Wichita Agency near Anadarko, taking advantage of an old friendship with peaceful Indians. Troops from Fort Sill, however, caught them there and a wild fight ensued.



Oil portrait of General W. T. Sherman
by H. H. Cross

The cavalry took to the plains in force late in the summer, intending either to capture or kill all Indians loose on the southern plains. From Camp Supply in the northeast, Forts Bascom and Union in New Mexico and other forts in west Texas, the commands of Colonel Miles, Major Price and Colonel Mackenzie drove wedges into the high plains. A large number of Cheyennes, Comanches and Kiowas were surprised by Mackenzie in Palo Duro Canon, south of the present site of Amarillo, and their food, lodgings and transport were destroyed to prevent recapture.

The engagement took place near the end of September. It was no joke to the Indians to be roaming the now-buffaloless, always waterless plains in the winter without food, shelter, or the means of acquiring them. Very few Indians were killed in these engagements. Mackenzie suffered only one man wounded, but the Indians were ready to call it quits. The troops seemed to be able to find them whenever they tried to hide or move.

Soon after Mackenzie's Palo Duro Cañon fight, some Kiowas were located and punished on the Salt Forks of the Red River. Major Price and his Navajo scouts, as well as Captain Chaffee and others, attacked camps in Indian Territory whenever they could find

them. Then the military effort shifted again to the Texas Panhandle, lasting through the winter of 1874-75.

By March of 1875, the Cheyennes had all come into the agency. In June the last band of the Comanches—the Quohada—surrendered at Fort Sill. The Indian wars of the southern plains were ended and, in part due to the intensification of the same type of warfare in the north, were soon forgotten.

The events which culminated one year and twenty-two days later in the Battle of the Little Big Horn captured the interest and imagination of the people back East, as the southern plains wars had not. The events of the north in 1876 were certainly better covered in the eastern press. Custer, in fact, not to overlook any potential, had a reporter with him. The Sioux and Cheyenne evidently didn't even notice that he wasn't in uniform.

The Messenger, oil, by Frederic Remington.



Oil portrait of General P. H. Sheridan
by H. H. Cross.

says in his "Records of Engagements" that attacks in the Departments of the Missouri and of Texas during the first five months of the year were infrequent.

June, however, saw the beginning of a war on the bison hunters, settlers, and even the agencies. The Kiowa and Comanche combined forces with the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho, forcing the abandon-

Attack at Dawn, reproduced on this page, is one of ten oils in the Gilcrease collection by Charles Schreyvogel, a latter-day illustrator of scenes of the Old West. This painting depicts a surprise raid on an Indian village similar to that led by Custer in 1868 upon a Cheyenne encampment on the banks of the Washita, in present-day Oklahoma.

Represented below are items from the collection of Plains Indians weapons and artifacts housed by the Gilcrease Institute.



To return to the commands of the southern plains, it is interesting to note that some of the problems faced by a military commander of the period, both mundane and private in nature, were of a type not often recorded in history books. The traits of character and personality which are essentially responsible for a man's behavior, and without knowledge of which the particular behavior may be difficult to understand, are frequently glossed over. Other than actually knowing the individual, the letters and reports he writes often become the best way to gain an insight into his character, and enable us to glean a more complete historic picture.

Fort Sill J.T., April 17, 1875
Lieutenant General P. H. Sheridan.

My Dear General, I wish you could come here for a few days or that I could see you, but it is not possible for me now to leave.

If you can get here from New Orleans I think it would be a good place for you to come. There are some matters with reference to the management of affairs here on which I wish to talk with you.

First, General Pope wishes to divide my Regiment between Colonel Miles and myself. While I like Miles I think that this ought not be done and was very much hurt by even such a proposition being made.

Second, General Pope wishes to divide the control of these Indians between Colonel Miles and myself, giving me the Posts at the Agencies and Miles Supply and the Contonments. This arrangement is bad.

The same officer should have the control of these Indians when quiet and when they are out. If I simply have control of the Posts at Agencies, I will not be able to go into the field promptly and I will not have the men under my command to go with and will soon be held in no respect by the Indians. It is essential that the Cantonments should be under the Control of the Commanding Officer here, and camp Supply also should be in operations in this Department. The Geography of the Country will necessitate any column in the field from this part of the Department very soon drawing its supplies from some point near the edge of the Plains near the Head of North Fork and coming through Supply from Dodge.

Now if I have Eight Companies to be divided between this Post and the Cheyenne Agency and Miles four of mine and two others at Supply and Cantone-ment, my own opinion is that there will not be more than six or seven companies of cavalry which can be properly got into the field from all places at the same time, and I know that for field duty the best plan is to use a Regiment from about Six companies and have the remainder in position to relieve them after a time. There is in fact clearly to my mind but one command here. General Pope was very kind to me. Offered me either. Now I do not want any Nominal power but I wish the real power or else not to have the semblance of Power without the authority.

I wish to have control in this Territory and honestly think I ought to have it. I have no word to say against

Colonel Miles on the contrary I regard him as a very fine officer. I am not in the slightest degree jealous of him. I regard him not as my Superior in any way and in some particulars I am sure he is not my equal.

I either desire, without any nominal power pretty General authority in this Territory or think it is very much better to let Colonel Miles or some other man have it.

The following was my plan based on the arrange-ment made by General Augur giving me virtually com-plete Control of my Regiment and of a Depot near the Head of the South Fork. 1st In December last I entered into an arrangement with Jose Piedad a Mexican Indian Trader & that he should go back to New Mexico in the Spring form a band, to trade with the Quahada Coman-ches, on staked Plains that I would control as I was then informed I would, a camp on the Head of North Fork of Red River, and that he should furnish informa-tion of the where abouts of Quahades and at the proper time we could strike them. In this plan there was another Mexican of the New Mexican Comanche Traders who was to return from New Mexico as my staked Plains Guide. This man has got back as far as Griffin on his way to me.

2d Prior to seeing General Pope I was arranging with Kicking Bird so soon as Bankhead with the only Companies that are fit for immediate service arrives to start a strong Command to the edge of the Plains with a large party of Kiowas, their principal fighting men, Women & children too, ostensibly buffalo hunting and in fact in the first instance no one but Kicking Bird, understanding that it was not simply a hunt. That Kick-ing Bird would through a few of his people get in com-munication with the Quahades and in a little while we could arrange to get within some seventy miles without exciting suspicion. I can take my people when their horses are in any shape at all from Seventy to Eighty miles between daylight one day and daylight the next day. I believe even further and keep them together and barring accident can catch the Quahades.


I of course promised both Piedad and Kicking Bird large rewards of horses in case of success. Now if General Pope carries out his present views all the ground is knocked from under me and the Army and another man can do just as well here as I can. I am not writing in the spirit of complaint but there is a cer-tain broad public policy about these arrangements which is true and should succeed in the end.

I do not wish to get out of this duty hard as it is provided I can see my way clear to doing well.

Nor do I feel that it is the desire of any of my Superiors to slight me. I believe honestly that in breadth of views, and in a certain power which can only be ac-quired by time, acquaintance with a subject, and a knowledge of many men I am far superior to any offi-cer commanding any of the Posts in the Indian Territory or Texas and have the power to combine in a way no one else can readily acquire, at the same time I do not think at all that I am invaluable.

I did not do any intriguing to get the command General Augur proposed to me, but I do not really believe it wise to strip me of the power of executing proper plans formed in the knowledge derived from General Augur and yourself, that I was to have such control.

Now all these plans may "go awry" I should have said nothing of them had I not deemed it under the circumstances best. but I am sure it is best to give some-one the full control.



Portrait of Colonel Nelson A. Miles, Mackenzie's chief rival for command of cantonments in Indian Territory and Texas, is another of the oils in the Gilcrease collection by H. H. Cross.

General Ord wrote me some weeks ago a very kind letter expressing his wish that I should go back to Texas. I do not now wish to go. Seven of my Companies are in a broken down condition from the horses with them not getting sufficient forage on their return to Posts last winter. They need great care. The Regiment has also been moved so much that a good part of it should have rest & be filled to its strength with Recruits & Horses. Concerning Recruits, General Townsend does not appear fully informed and it is very essential that they should be got at the very earliest possible moment.

Neither do I wish to leave General Popes command, The General very kindly assured me that should there be any considerable field operations I should have the principal command. but in that case I feel quite sure that Col. Miles if proposed arrangement is carried out will feel himself aggrieved. I of course understand both the propriety and the necessity of General Pope's com-manding his Department fully himself. I shall of course

under any circumstances go ahead and do the best I can. This position is one of difficulty at best. There are about two hundred Cheyenne men out and just about the same number of Comanches and until Bankhead arrives I regard the condition of affairs here as exceedingly criti-cal. I dislike writing this letter very much: and wish that instead I might have seen you, but can see no immediate possibility of that. To sum the whole thing there is the necessity for one leading officer in this Territory and but one. I wish to have the place my-self only provided I am preferred for such place by General Pope to any one else.

Colonel Miles whose name I mentioned I regard as a very fine officer and one to whom I have always been friendly. I wish first & first by far to go to work if I am desired and second if it is not thought well to give me enough swing to have a good prospect of accomplishing some result I wish quietly to be detailed for some fancy duty North and allowed to have a quiet comfortable time till such time as I am wanted particularly.


I have said more about myself in this letter than I think I have spoken or written previously in all the course of my life. Please be sure I am not in the Sulks, or anything of that sort, but have simply made up my mind as to what is best, and having made up my mind, am very sure of it. I have written very much in the same strain to Williams and asked him to show the letter to General Pope and to Miles if he thought it best and have not the least objection to your showing this one to either or both if you even think its well.

I wish to do my duty fully and I wish to be East just as much as I can. after doing my duty, during the next two or three years.

This letter is written by Mr. Parker simply be-cause I write so hard a hand to read myself. Please bring General Townsend on the Recruits & Bankhead with his command—you know I am no Stampeder.

Very Respectfully, Your friend.

(Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie)



U. S. Regulation Dress Helmet

Except for the Apache problem in the Southwest, the desperate and pathetic attempt of some of the northern Sioux and Cheyenne to remain free on their ancestral land and the equally pathetic revolt of frequently half-starved reservation Indians, the Indian difficulties were virtually settled in the United States by 1878, although the Anglo-American people at that time had no way of knowing it. In their search for food, horses, and other supplies, small groups of Indians would kill settlers and teamsters just as dead as they had prior to 1873. The Indians still had a great deal to be angry about. No group of proud people likes to be confined and herded, particularly when, within the memory of even their children, they had been as free as the wind, guiding their own destinies by the unwritten laws of their own culture.

Corruption in the logistical chain, bigotry or stupidity in the regulating authority, and poor management in the Indian Department or on the reservations, created conditions which were virtually intolerable. Troops had to be kept on or near the reservations, and small bands of "renegades" created particular problems which only experienced Indian fighters could fully comprehend. Occasionally the Congressional Committee on Military Affairs would seek the advice of the field commanders in order to better understand and appropriate for this military area.

The following is Mackenzie's recommendations as of February 1878.

Fort Clark, Texas; February 25th, 1878
Hon. Levi Waish)
" Edw'd S. Bragg)
" Harry White)

Sub-Committee, Military Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen: In reply to your letter of December 19th, 1877, which was only received by me some days after my arrival at this Post during the present month, I have the honor to submit the following:

Assuming an Army of thirty thousand enlisted men of the line.

I. It appears that the Regimental organizations could be retained in their present form without disadvantage. A fair proportion—taking into consideration the number of seaboard Forts to garrison and the extensive, wild frontier,—would be about nineteen thousand Infantry, eight thousand Cavalry, and three thousand artillery. With a permanent reduction of the number of enlisted men below a strength of thirty thousand, there should be a reduction of Regimental organizations, and of officers, corresponding in number to the reduction of the men. But there seems to be substantial reasons for increasing the Army rather than reducing permanently, which will be referred to hereafter.

II. There should be some organization for Artillery as well as for other arms of the service. A battery is the unit of Artillery as the Company of the other arms, and, while from the small size of our Army but a single battery of each Regiment of Artillery is kept up, still, in time of war the Artillery would necessarily be organized in brigades of several batteries, forming the Artillery of Divisions, with reserves for the Corps or Army,

or both; and an organization which would permit of a change without shock should be retained. The Independent batteries furnished by various states, were, I believe on just the same footing in the Army as Regimental batteries, forming like others,—Regular or Volunteer,—a battery of a brigade or general reserve, and were no more independent—except in name. They were independent in the sense that they were not a part of any Regiment, and probably their Captains had less advantage of promotion than those similarly situated belonging to Regimental organizations. There should be a Major to every four companies of Artillery, which could form, in time of War, a brigade of four batteries; and Field Officers of higher grades to command larger bodies. Indeed the organization is very well as it is. It is a question which principally would interest Artillery Officers, and of which they can speak with more weight.

III. The proportion of General Officers who command troops, not including General Officers who are heads of various Staff Corps, should be, about one Brigadier General to every four Regiments of the line, and one Major General to every twelve, with one Lieutenant General, or General, to the entire army. The two senior positions of the Army now, expire with the present incumbents. They were created for great war services; but one at least of these positions, might be retained for the head,—under the President,—of the military organization.

IV. Answered generally, under No. I

V. The Staff, as it is called in our Army, may be divided into the Military Staff and the Department of Supply. The Military Staff, having charge of correspondence and orders, and of the duty of collecting, arranging and furnishing information on question of detail, to the President and various General Officers,—which is the real staff of the Army—embraces the Adjutant Generals and Inspector Generals. There are certain duties, purely of the Staff, performed by other Corps, particularly by the Corps of Engineers in the collection of topographical information; but really the Adjutant and Inspector General's Departments are the Staff proper. The Corps of Engineers should be considered as a special scientific Corps, having varied duties, which in time of peace, are perhaps, more civil than military,—having too, on the one hand, duties corresponding with those of the line in command of Engineer troops, and, on the other hand, a closer affiliation with the Staff proper, than those Departments which are purely interested in administration and supply. The quarter-master, Subsistence and Pay Departments, may be grouped together under the general head of Supply Department, while the Ordnance is, in part, a special scientific Corps, and in part a Department of Supply. Probably the most important organization of the Army is its Staff proper. In our army there is no question that the Adjutant General and Inspector General's Departments have an exceptional amount of influence, not only in framing orders for the government of the Army, but also in the statement of information and the procurement of legislation. This Corps, representing the Army proper, that is, the

real Army, the troops of the line, at the seat of government, at the Headquarters of the various Generals, should be in thorough harmony with the troops,—understanding fully their varied duties, and the circumstances under which they live, identified with their interests. The present organization of our Staff, (of the Adjutant General and Inspector General's Departments) does not at all fulfill any such condition, though composed of gentlemen of high standing; the nature of the laws under which they hold their positions has been such as, in the higher grades, to peculiarly unfit the officer for the duty which he is called on to perform. Recent-service with troops, the command of a battalion, a Regiment or a Post, would bring back, far more vividly than the memory of many years ago, the various needs and hardships of the mass who compose our Army,—the officers and men of the line. The routine life of an officer in one of our large cities may, perhaps, produce an officer of great method and care in the management of important records, but is little likely to form a kind and judicious adviser on great military questions, which the higher officers of the staff should be always. Probably no officer of the line of the Army who has been

Even Chances oil by Charles Schreyvogel, reproduced below. Gilcrease collection.



Consolidated sick-report, Fort Concho, Tex.

Year	1870-'71.	1871-'72.	1872-'73.*	1873-'74†
Mean strength	{ Officers 13 { Enlisted men 14		{ Officers 19 { Enlisted men 200	
	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths
GENERAL DISEASES, A.				
Small-pox			1	
Typhoid fever			2	1
Remittent fever				2
Intermittent fever	1	3	34	126
Yellow fever				1
Other diseases of this group		1	6	6
GENERAL DISEASES, B.				
Rheumatism			7	45
Syphilis			3	5
Consumption			3	3
Other diseases of this group			4	4
LOCAL DISEASES.				
Catarrh and bronchitis	1		1	27
Pneumonia				1
Pleurisy			1	5
Diarrhoea and dysentery		2	41	162
Hernia			2	4
Gonorrhoea				1
Other local diseases	3	1	6	269
Alcoholism			1	6
Total disease	5	1	12	159
VIOLENT DISEASES AND DEATHS.				
Gun-Shot wounds			4	1
Other accidents and injuries	1	1	36	165
Homicide				
Total violence	1	1	40	169

*Eight months only. †Eleven months only.



brought into immediate contact with troops, who has not thought, very often, with perhaps some bitterness, how very much time and effort were expended over the little by the Staff; how matters were considered that should be disposed of by subordinates, and how, on questions of quite serious public business, it was sometimes impossible to obtain even an answer. The legislation making the positions in the Adjutant and Inspector General's Departments permanent, is at the root of the present want of harmony between the line and the staff, — at the root of a discouragement which is quite general, and of a bitter feeling that those who should be the first to represent what would benefit the mass in legislation, are far more taken up with what will benefit themselves. There are many examples of this which have occurred in the course of legislation since the war, but a single instance taken in that branch of the staff which should specially guard the interest of all, will serve to show what is meant. The Adjutant General is, under the Act of July 28, 1866, to be appointed by selection from the officers of the Adjutant General's Department and the same is the case with the Chiefs of the other Staff Corps. Now, the Army cannot be benefitted by such an Act. There is no Department which has such great power for good or for evil as the Adjutant General's and what would aid the real Army is, that in any future promotion the very best officer for the place should be selected. It is little likely that many attach great importance to a thorough knowledge of the whereabouts of papers, which is indeed useful, but rather subordinate. The main thing is, that the Adjutant General should be a thorough soldier; and the line, I do not believe, much cares where he comes from so long as that is the case. But I charge that this legislation was procured in the interest of a few officers who could, — so far as this branch of the staff is concerned, — be counted on the fingers of one hand, regardless of the rights and interests of a thousand others. Every officer who had entered the Army prior to 1866, had a certain right infringed by the passage of this Act. Every officer of standing may now consider himself injured in that, positions which, since the establishment of the government, had been within his reach, have been closed to him in the interest of about a dozen officers. After a very great war, the road to certain high military positions was closed by intrigue on those, with a few exceptions, who had distinguished themselves in the field. There is a single, practical remedy for the present state of affairs which will not work the least injustice to any Staff Officer. Consolidate the Adjutant and Inspector General's Departments in one Staff Corps, with one Brigadier General as Chief; three Colonels, six Lieutenant Colonels: and twelve Majors, the same number now

allowed by law. After the decrease in the Inspector General's Department shall have taken place, enact 1st: That in case of a vacancy in the position of Adjutant General, it be filled by the transfer of any officer of the same grade on selection and promotion of any officer of the Army. 2d: That on the 1st day of January of every alternate year, commencing with 1879, that the Colonel of longest service in the Adjutant General's Department be transferred to the line, and an officer by a method to be hereafter designated, be transferred to fill his place. 3d: That on the 1st of January of every year the Lieutenant Colonel and the two Majors of the longest service in the Corps, be transferred to positions in the same grade in the line, the vacancies to be filled in a manner to be hereafter indicated. 4th: That no officer be transferred from the grade of Brigadier General to the position of Adjutant General, or promoted from any grade to Adjutant General, except on the recommendation of the General of the Army. That Department Commanders shall yearly recommend such Lieutenant Colonel's and Majors serving in their Department, as are, in their opinion, suitable for transfer to the Adjutant General's Department; that the General shall select, and be authorized to transfer yearly, one Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors to the Adjutant General's Department, who will be chosen from those recommended by Department Commanders and approved by all higher authority in the usual course, below the Commanding General. That the General of the Army be authorized to transfer one Colonel every alternate year, commencing with the 1st of January 1879, from the line of the Army, but such Colonel must have been recommended by the Department Commander, and every higher military authority in due course. That the officers of longest service in the Adjutant General's Department, referred to in the various grades of Colonel, Lieutenant, Colonel and Major, be transferred to the vacancies in the line occasioned by the transfer of the officers of corresponding grade in the line. That all officers of the Staff Department thus transferred, shall be eligible for a re-transfer to the staff after four years continuous service with troops in the Departments which embrace the wilder portions of the country; but that no officer shall be eligible until four years of such continuous service have been performed.


In writing what I have, I wish it understood, that I am making no personal attack on the present Adjutant General, but on what I consider a very false system and bad legislation to the great injury of the government in the interest of a few officers.

VI. The Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments could be consolidated, and a very great decrease in number of the officers, made. Probably thirty offi-


Surprise Attack, oil by Charles Schreyvogel, reproduced below. Gilcrease collection.



Henry Carbine. (Repeater)



Sharps Carbine. B.L.




Spencer Rifle. B.L.

cers are an ample number for the two Corps when united, Wherever these Departments touch the troops the work is now done almost entirely by Lieutenants of Regiments detailed for the purpose. The principal duties now performed by the officers proper of these Corps are those of supervision at the offices of the Chiefs of the Corps at Washington, and at the Headquarters of the Divisions and Departments, and of purchase in the principal markets.

It appears to me that this work could be better done by thirty really able men than by the far greater number of officers now employed. The places which look quite large, but are not so really, is perhaps, a considerable evil. For instance, there is ordinarily at least one officer of both the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments stationed at Boston, which is not at all, neces-


SWORDS.



Frederic Remington

sarily, a market where supplies must be purchased, for, from that city, it is only convenient to supply a small body of troops, and a Lieutenant stationed at one of the Posts in the Harbor could transact the business exactly as well, and with a great saving to the government in the pay and quarters of the officers, the officer room which is frequently extravagant, and the hire of clerks.

At the principal purchasing points there should be carefully selected officers stationed. These points are few: New York, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, being, I should judge, the only places which require the presence of an officer for purchasing alone. It seems to me that the pay and allowances of the officers retained in the Supply Department should be particularly good. I believe the government would be benefitted with having no officer in the Corps thus formed, receiving pay and emoluments less than those now given to a Major. The consolidation of these two Corps should be made with great care, and no officer should be retained in the new organization who is not only of unquestionable integrity, but of far more than ordinary business capacity. All worthy officers who were not considered sufficiently capable, should be provided for by retirement or otherwise, while those who were not thought particularly entitled to consideration might very well be dropped from the service. In this Corps, the positions might be to a degree, more permanent than the Staff Corps proper formed from the union of the Adjutant General's Department and that of the Inspector General; but the principle should be recognized, that an officer of good character, but found to have little business capacity, might, on recommendation of the Chief of the Corps, be transferred to the line of the Army, and an officer of similar grade in the line who had received the recommendation of fitness from his Department Commander and all superiors in due course, be transferred to the Department in his stead. The promotions to vacancies in this corps should be made from officers of Regiments of the grade of Captain, or Lieutenant who had served two years or more in either the Quartermaster or Subsistence Departments, or in the consolidated Corps, while belonging to the line, and such promotions should only be made by the President on the recommendation of the General of the Army whose selection should be made from those who had received the recommendations of their Regimental and Department Commanders, and all other superiors below the Commanding General. The officers of the Corps of Supply should, perhaps, be about as follows: one Brigadier General, ten Colonels, ten Lieutenant Colonels and nine Majors, or officers having the emoluments of these grades with perhaps less rank, for I do not regard rank as so very essential



a thing in this Department as it is in the Staff proper. All duties of the supply Department at Posts would be done as it generally is now, by Lieutenants detailed for the purpose.

The pay of the Army could probably be as well managed after a time through this Department as through the present Pay Corps. There would be very little additional trouble given to a Post Quartermaster in paying the Command, and indeed it would afford advantages of more frequent payments, which would be very well.

The Corps of Engineers and of Ordnance are special in their nature. The Engineers are rarely brought in contact with the line of the Army. The Ordnance, so far as the Infantry and Cavalry are concerned, endeavors with judgement to give satisfaction. In the matter of small arms, there is the important question of a sufficient reserve of the best breechloading arms; There should certainly be in the Arsenal of this country, particularly with so small an army as we keep up, a reserve of not less than one hundred and fifty thousand rifles of the best pattern, and of thirty thousand Carbines. I do not know our condition in this particular, but it would be well to look into it and appropriate, to the end that a sufficient supply of arms be always in readiness.

VII. There are numerous Posts which could be abandoned and the troops massed where they could be more reasonably cared for. The Posts on the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific are no longer necessary, and the massing of troops at such a point as Leavenworth,


would be, I believe, an ultimate saving of expense to the government and of great improvement to both officers and men. In the same way I believe it would be of corresponding advantage to the government to station a very considerable portion of the troops employed in the state of Texas at some point on a railroad, say near the city of San Antonio, which would perhaps be the most convenient. When troops are not needed for the field all the supplies would cost far less than at remote stations. The discipline of the Regiments stationed together would improve, and, what is much to the individual and no small matter to the government, the content and happiness of both officers and men would be much increased, while, when troops were needed for field service, they would be at convenient points to be sent in any direction.

VIII. Answered generally under VII.

IX. The improvement of the enlisted men will follow improvement of the officers. There are several causes which now operate against the officer. The lack of advancement through ability and good character, the failure of punishment reaching those who have acted wrongly, the location of troops in small bodies

MACKENZIE'S 1872 EXPEDITION

— MACKENZIE'S ROUTE
--- MILITARY WAGON ROAD



and habitually at more remote stations than is essential. The system which has been in force for many years of promoting to positions in the Staff Corps for other reason than for marked efficiency, and rather on account of personal or political influence. Generally, the enlisted men will improve with the improvement of the officer, the officer with the general administration of the government. A young man, carefully educated, with ambition, with high hopes of success, enters the Army and finds no road to advancement through exertion. He is probably constantly thrown in a position where he has few good associates; he may resist dissipation for a time, but many young men of original good character, undoubtedly come to ruin from the circumstances of their life,—from the isolation, with dissipation always obtainable, respectable society seldom, little incitement to do well, small prospect of punishment following on neglect or drunkenness. It does not appear at all remarkable that respectable young men should go wrong, but that sometimes they do go right.

1st. Throwing open the Staff proper to all officers on purely military recommendation while transfers to and promotions therein, were removed by law from the personal and political pressure which now in no small manner govern the selections for the Corps, giving encouragement for renewed exertion to all worthy officers.

2nd. The organization of the Supply Department with the immense saving in funds for the barracks and quarters which I believe would there from result, setting free a large sum appropriated by Congress to go where it should, making comfortable the officers and men of Regiments.

3rd. Collecting troops in considerable bodies in large garrisons at such points as Fort Leavenworth, from which when wanted they could be sent for field service, leaving all their heavy impedimenta, with an ultimate great saving to the government and an immense improvement to officers and men.

4th. Increasing the flow of promotion by the retirement of all worthy officers unfit for services, and the dismissal or dropping from the service of those who were an incumbrance.

These varied changes would I am quite sure, raise the standing of the officers and of the enlisted men necessarily as well.

I believe that raising the pay of Regimental Sergeant Major, Quartermaster Sergeant, and the First Sergeants of Companies, largely, while the pay of all Sergeants should be somewhat increased, would be of the greatest advantage. The introduction of the English system of Canteens, abolishing our present Sutler system, would be a decided benefit. The whole matter is a very large


one, and one which requires a great deal of thought before action is taken. I trust that the Committee, of which you, gentlemen, are members, will take abundant time before urging to passage any law, and will take the liberty, very respectfully, of saying, that it appears to me it would be far better to put the matter over to the next session, if the same Committee could then have charge of it. That the Army requires re-organization, I do not believe there is any question; but any hasty re-organization will be probably as bad as the present state of affairs.

The Army, that is, the real army, the troops of the line, are not now nearly as numerous as the Country needs. There are questions which I do not think perhaps, entirely judicious to discuss, which make me feel quite sure that not only there should be no reduction, but that an increase of the Army to fifty thousand enlisted men, may be a contingency not very remote, and which Congress may soon be called on to consider.

I have the honor to be, Gentlemen,
Very respectfully, Your obed't Servant.
Colonel, 4th, Cavalry.

Six months after this recommendation was formulated, one of the most famous incidents of the plains conquest period took place. Some 330 northern Cheyenne left the reservation at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, to return to their northern homelands. Mackenzie was at Fort Clark, deep in southern Texas, but part of his command was "responsible" for allowing the Indians to escape. Mackenzie was mortified and requested duty with that portion of the command. He deplored the reflection on him that this inaction might create in the mind of the Department Commander; but the Department Commander felt that Mackenzie was already in an area where his talents might be more beneficial.

The Mexican Government had dispatched 5,000 troops to the border. Almost a year after Mackenzie's recommendation for a Frontier Army, he was confronted with the possibility of facing 5,000 Mexican troops with a few companies of cavalry. The expected border incident never materialized, and once again Mackenzie was transferred. In the late summer of 1879 the Utes of the White River Agency in Colorado became troublesome, and Agent Meeker asked for military aid, but later refused it. This was a grave error on his part, for by October all the men in the Agency had been killed by the Indians. Many troops, including the 4th Cavalry, were dispatched to the area.




ARTILLERY (small)

Fort Sill, I. T., May 25th
1875

My dear General. I send you copies of a couple of letters received from Dr. Sturm who was sent to bring in the Quahades Comanches if possible. Unless there is an unforeseen accident, his success will be much greater than I anticipated when I sent him. It will be a wonderfully rich surrender. As the Bands coming in will give up about 4,000 ponies and mules. After these people come in, I will be compelled to hire some Kiowas and Comanches as herders, whom I will pay in ponies after they have finished their prescribed work. In the case the Quahades come in, there will be no necessity of a Post of very large size at the cantonment this summer and I can bring two companies of my Regiment in here, and send the two companies of the 11th Infantry to the Cheyenne Agency at once. Sending the two companies of the 5th Infantry where you desire them. The citizen teamsters will be reduced to the number designated in endorsement from your Headquarters as soon as they come in from the road. I did not like hiring them in the first instance, but if you remember, there was an immediate necessity in the sending of the troops to the cantonment and the Cheyenne Agency, also the prisoners for Leavenworth.

The indications are that there will be perfect quiet among the hostile Indians this year belong to this Agency. I write you privately because this is still to be completed, and I do not like to report officially an uncertainty. The leggins and mocassins I have saved for you and the shield I will get when these people come in.



CAVALRY

ORDNANCE (small)

ENGINEERS (small)

ENGINEERS (large)

U. S. Army Regulation Buttons



Above illustration taken from J. C. Taylor's sketchbook, depicts an incident which occurred in 1879 during the Ute uprising in Colorado. Miss Meeker was taken captive when her

father, chief agent of the White River Agency, was killed by the Utes, following his refusal of military aid from the U. S. Cavalry.

Fort Sill, I.T., June 3rd (1875)

My dear General. The Quahades got in yesterday that is, the mass of them. There are still about as near as I can make out about twenty men who are not in one band, but divided in different little parties. Their people are much fewer than I have expected and have not nearly the amount of stock that they had several years ago, and have not a good (colt or foal) in the tribe.

They say that the balance will follow in.

I sent orders to Bankhead to start on the Staked Plains with two companies and try to find up any stragglers that he may be able to find.

I think better of this band than of any other on the reserve as they have steadily been out, and now come in at a most unusual time. I shall let them down as easily as I can.

There will be about a thousand head of ponies and mules to sell. I have instructed the Post Quartermaster to advertise the sale giving until the 5th of July.

Those mocasins went by the last mail those bought here cost six dollars if gotten from the Cheyenne Agency. I have not received the bill. Unless you send again I will not have six pair of leggins made for the buckskin costs more here than in the north. I will get some of the things turned in by the Quahades and send you.

Very respectfully, Your
R. S. Mackenzie

Fort Sill, I.T., Sept. 5th 1875

My dear General. I have to state that it seems very probable that there will be very great suffering among the Indians near this Post during the coming winter, unless more energy than has been recently manifested by the Interior Department can be put forth. During the months of July and August no part of the ration other than fresh beef for those months was forwarded up to the date of receipt of instructions from the Department Commander contained in letter of July 31st certain deficiencies were supplied by issues of stores by the Post Commissary to Indian Agent J. M. Hayworth under letter of instructions of A. A. J. dated and so far as flour was concerned by that left from the past fiscal year which was on hand, in part from failure of the Interior Department to forward supplies when needed during the past winter, and in part from the fact that large issues were made by the Military authorities during the past fiscal year to Indians held as prisoners of war. On the last day of August the Agent had no sugar, salt or coffee on hand, and but enough flour for at most (2) two issues, and this when transportation has been for a long time easily obtained and while the best months of the year were slipping by.

There is now in the hands of the Agent scarcely enough flour for a single issue, but some sugar and coffee has arrived since the first of the month. Now

here is a large body of Indians which during four (4) months of comparatively favorable weather there has been failure properly to provide for. There remains but (2) two which can be at all calculated on for wagon transportation. Can not the Interior Dept. be induced to adopt such measures as will bring their supplies here without fail? I have addressed this letter to you personally General for various reasons. I do not wish particularly at this time to assail the Interior Dept. but I do desire that this letter be brought to the notice of the highest authority. It seems to me that it is almost a misuse of Troops to require them to control these Indians during the next winter unless a very different amount of energy is infused into the management of Indian Affairs from that which has been apparent since my arrival at this place. In all this matter the Agent is in nowise to blame but some higher authority whom I do not know and as I once quoting the opinions of others, spoke unfavorably of Mr. Hayworth I wish, to say that so far as my observations extends he is doing what he is able and doing right. In writing this letter General in our usual form I wish to say that though retaining a copy I have not entered it on my official records which can be done at any future time it is desired at the same time I have not the slightest objection to its being shown to any officer of the Interior Dept. I feel that there is a heavy responsibility resting on me to try and act rightly for these Indians.

Mackenzie stayed at Fort Garland for awhile, and then after a brief period in Kansas and Arkansas, was ordered west to campaign against the Apaches in Arizona and from the District Headquarters in New Mexico. These are the last entries in the ledger now housed in the Gilcrease Library, and soon afterward the man who was probably the greatest of all Indian fighters was retired.

A few of the books in the Gilcrease Library pertaining to Ranald S. Mackenzie and the Southern Plains Indians available to those interested:

Gregg, Josiah—"Commerce of the Prairies, or, The Journal of a Santa Fe Trader"—1831-1839.

James, Thomas—"Three Years Among the Mexicans and Indians" St. Louis: 1916

Ranald S. Mackenzie Journal (manuscript)

Mayhall, Mildred P.—"The Kiowas"—University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1962.

Marriott, Alice—"The Ten Grandmothers" University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1945.

Nye, Col. W. S.—"Carbine and Lance" University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1943.

Richardson, Rupert N.—"The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement." The Arthur H. Clark Co., Glendale, Cal., 1933.

Thomas, Alfred Barnaby—"Forgotten Frontiers" University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1932.

"The Plains Indians and New Mexico" University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma.


"Theodoro De Groix" University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma.

Wallace, Ernest—"Ranald S. Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier"—The Museum Journal, The West Texas Museum Association, Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas, Vol. VII-VIII, 1963-1964.

Wallace, Ernest and Hoebel, E. Adamson—"The Comanches, Lords of the South Plains" University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1952.

Sowell, A. J.—"Texas Indian Fighters"—Ben C. Jones & Co., Ptrs., Austin, Texas, 1900.

Government Documents—"Texas Border Troubles" 3 volumes, Documentary History of the Texas Frontier. G. P. O., Washington, D. C., 1860-1878.



Frederic Ren